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Abstract—In this paper we consider a wiretap channel with a
secret key buffer. We use the coding scheme of [1] to enhance the
secrecy rate to the capacity of the main channel, while storing
each securely transmitted message in the secret key buffer. We
use the oldest secret bits from the buffer to be used as a secret
key to transmit a message in a slot and then remove those bits.
With this scheme we are able to prove stronger results than
those in [1]. i.e., not only the message which is being transmitted
currently, but all the messages transmitted in last N1 slots are
secure with respect to all the information that the eavesdropper
possesses, where N1 can be chosen arbitrarily large.
Index Terms—Secret key, Physical Layer Security, Secrecy
Capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner’s seminal paper on wiretap channel [2] provided a
coding scheme for achieving secrecy capacity for a degraded
wiretap channel, i.e., when Eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) channel is
degraded with respect to (w.r.t.) the main receiver’s channel.
If the main channel capacity is C and Eve’s channel capacity
is Ce, then Wyner proved that secrecy capcity is Cs = C −
Ce. Thus there can be a substantial loss of rate due to the
security constraint. More generally, a Broadcast channel with
confidential messages was studies in [3], where Eve’s channel
is not assumed to be degraded. In [3], the authors have also
shown the trade-off between secrecy and the achievable rate.
One way to overcome the rate loss is to use some shared
secret key with rate RK . Then the achievable secrecy rate
is min {Cm, (Cm − Ce +RK)+} (Chapter 17, [4]). The first
work on secret key generation is reported in [5]. In this paper
the authors assume a public discussion channel for exchanging
functions, and then to agree on a key. The eavesdropper
“hears” the whole conversation. [6] discusses two types of
models: Source type model and Channel type model. Secret
key generation via the sources and channels was investigated
in [7] and [8] and for multiple terminals in [9].
Wiretap channel with rate-distortion has been studied in
[10].
Another technique to enhance the secrecy rate is the use
of feedback as in [11] where the authors have considered
the wiretap channel with secure rate limited feedback. This
feedback is used to agree on a secret key. Wiretap channel
with shared key was studied in [12].
Recently, a multiplex coding based wiretap coding scheme
is proposed which also achieves secrecy rate equal to the main
channel capacity [13]. In this work, as in [1], the authors
have shown that each individual message is secure w.r.t. Eve’s
output. The coding schemes in [13] and [1] are different.
A slow fading wiretap channel with a secret key buffer was
studied in [14]. The authors study the scenario where different
secret messages are being transmitted in different slots and
consider the equivocation of a message with the outputs of
the channel to the eavesdropper in the same slot. In [15] the
authors compute the equivocation of all messages with the
outputs of the channel to the eavesdropper in all these slots.
In this paper the authors have used a secret key buffer to
leverage the secrecy capacity, i.e., when the main channel is
worse than Eve’s channel, secret key bits are used from the
buffer to transmit a message using a one time pad scheme.
The authors are not enhancing secrecy rate, rather they are
trying to nullify the fluctuation in secrecy capacity.
Strong secrecy based secret key agreement was introduced
in [16]. For a detailed survey of Information theoretic security
reader can refer to [17].
In this paper we do not assume any public channel or
feedback. As in [1], we use previous messages (which are
transmitted securely) as key and also use wiretap coding, in a
single slot to enhance the secrecy rate. After a finite number
of slots we can achieve secrecy rate equal to the main channel
capacity. Our scheme is much simpler than multiplex coding
technique proposed in [13]. Also, unlike in [13] and [1], we
show that at any time k, all messages transmitted in previous
N1 slots are securely transmitted while attaining secrecy rate
equal to the main channel capacity. The N1 can be taken as
large as we wish. To do this, we use a secret key buffer, as in
[15] but with the coding, decoding scheme of [1]. But unlike
in [15] we increase secrecy capacity to Shannon capacity
of the main channel and unlike in [1] we consider mutual
information between all the messages transmitted in recent
past with respect to all the data received by Eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section II
we present the system model and the coding/decoding scheme.
In Section III we state the main theorem with proof. The paper
concludes in Section IV. The proof of the two lemma’s used
in the proof of the theorem is provided in an appendix.
A note about the notation: capital letters, like W will
denote a random variable and the corresponding small letter
w its realization. An n-length vector (A1, A2, . . . , An) will be
Fig. 1. The Wiretap channel
denoted as An. Information theoretic notation will be same as
in [4].
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a discrete time, memoryless, degraded wiretap
channel, where Alice wants to transmit messages to Bob. There
is an eavesdropper (Eve) who is passively “listening”(Fig. 1).
We want to keep Eve ignorant of the messages.
Formally, Alice wants to communicate messages W ∈ W =
{1, 2, . . . , 2nRs} reliably over the Wiretap channel to Bob,
while ensuring that Eve is not able to decode them. Here Rs
is the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel defined as
Rs = max
p(x)
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)] . (1)
We assume Rs > 0. The transition probability matrix of the
channel is p(y, z|x). At time i, Xi is the channel input and the
legitimate receiver (Bob) and Eve receive the channel outputs
Yi and Zi respectively, where Xi ∈ X , Yi ∈ Y, Zi ∈ Z .
The messages Wm are generated uniformly from W and
{Wm,m ≥ 1} is an independent sequence. One or more
messages are encoded into an n length codeword. A mini-
slot consists of n channel uses. In our scheme, the first slot
consists of only one mini-slot. From next slot onwards a slot
has (M + 1) minislots where M is a large positive integer.
Let C be the capacity of Alice-Bob channel and [x] denote
the integer part of x. For simplicity, we take C
Rs
as integer.
The message Wk to be transmitted in slot k consists of one
or more messages Wm. The codeword for message W k is
denoted by Xk. The corresponding received bits by Eve are
Zk. To increase the secrecy rate, the transmitter uses previous
messages as the key for transmitting the message in a later
slot.
The message W k transmitted in slot k is stored as key in a
key buffer (of infinite length) for later use. After certain bits
from the key buffer are used as a key for data transmission,
those bits are discarded from the key buffer not to be used
again. Let Bk be the number of bits in the key buffer at the
beginning of slot k. Let Rk be the number of key bits used in
slot k from the key buffer. Then
Bk+1 = Bk + |Wk| −Rk (2)
where |Wk| denotes the number of bits in W k. Now we
explain the coding-decoding scheme used in this paper.
A. Encoder:
To transmit message W k in slot k, the encoder has two
parts
fs :W → X
n, fd :W
M ×K → XnM , (3)
where X ∈ X , and K is the set of secret keys generated and
fs is the wiretap encoder, as in [2]. For fd one can use various
encoders studied for transmission with secret key. We use the
following: Take binary version of the message and XOR with
the binary version of the key. Encode the resulting encrypted
message with an optimal usual channel encoder. Assume that
the key buffer at time 0 is empty. In the first slot a message
encoded using the wiretap coding only is transmitted. At the
end of slot 1, nRs bits of this message are stored in the key
buffer. Thus B1 = Rsn. In slot 2, message W 2 consisting of
two messages (W 21,W 22) = (W2,W3) are transmitted. W2 is
transmitted via wiretap coding and W3 uses W 1 as a key and
the encrypted message W 1 ⊕W3 is transmitted via a usual
capacity achieving channel code (e.g., an LDPC or a turbo
code can be used in practice). At the end of slot 2, Rsn bits of
W 1 are removed from the key buffer and 2Rsn bits of W 2 are
stored in the buffer key. Since Bob is able to decode W 1 with
a large probability, but not Eve, W 1 can be an effective key in
slot 2. In slot 3, message W 3 consisting of 3 messages from
the source message sequence are transmitted: one message in
the first mini slot denoted as W3,1 via wiretap coding and two
messages denoted together as W 3,2 via encryption with the
message W 2 as key bits. In slot k (W k = (W k,1,W k,2)) an
extra message from the source stream is transmitted (thus in
slot k, k messages are transmitted, (k − 1)Rsn bits from the
key buffer are removed in the beginning of slot k and kRsn
bits are added to the key buffer at the end of slot k). This
continues till slot M + 1. From slot M + 1 onwards M + 1
messages are transmitted in the above mentioned fashion.
We use the key buffer as a first in first out (FIFO) queue,
i.e., at any time the oldest key bits in the buffer are used first.
Also Bk → ∞ as k → ∞. Since we cannot transmit at a
rate higher than Bob’s capacity C, the maximum number of
messages that can be transmitted in a slot is 1 + C
Rs
M (this
is because in the first minislot using wiretap coding we can
transmit only at rate Rs and in the rest of the M minislots at
most at rate C). Once we reach this limit, from then onwards
1 + C
Rs
M messages will be transmitted in a slot. Thus the
maximum secrecy rate achievable in a slot via our coding-
decoding scheme is Rs+CM
M+1 which can be made as close to
C as we wish by making M arbitrarily large.
Decoder
For decoding at Bob, in slot 1 the usual wiretap decoder is
used (say joint-typicality decoder). From slot 2 onwards, for
the first minislot, we use the wiretap decoder while for rest
of the minislots, we use the channel decoder (corresponding
to the channel encoder used) and then XOR the decoded
message with the key used.
We will denote by Pne the probability that any of the
message transmitted in a slot is not received properly by Bob:
Pne = Pr(W k 6= Ŵk) where Ŵk is the decoded message by
Bob in slot k.
For secrecy we consider the leakage rate
1
n
I(W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1 ;Z1, . . . , Zk) in slot k where
N1 is an arbitrarily large positive integer which can be
chosen as a design parameter to take into account the secrecy
requirement of the application at hand. Then of course we
should be considering k > N1. From [1], we know that
1
n
I(W k;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk) → 0 as n → ∞, for all k ≥ 1. Our
current criterion for secrecy is stronger:
1
n
I
(
Wk, . . . ,Wk−N1 ;Z1, . . . , Zk
)
→ 0 as n→∞. (4)
III. CAPACITY OF WIRETAP CHANNEL
Theorem 3.1: The secrecy capacity of our coding-decoding
scheme is C for all k large enough.
Proof : As mentioned in the last section, by using our coding-
decoding scheme, using wiretap coding and secure key, in any
slot k Bob is able to decode the message W k with probability
Pne → 0 as n → ∞. Also, it is shown in [1], as our coding
scheme satisfies the properties needed in [1], we can show that
1
n
I(W k;Z1, . . . , Zk)→ 0, (5)
as n → ∞. Since the key buffer Bk → ∞, we use
the oldest key bits in the buffer first and in any slot do
not use more than M C
Rs
key bits, after sometime (say N2
slots) for all k ≥ N2 we will be using key bits only
from the messages W 1,W 2, . . . ,W k−N1−1 for messages
(W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1 . For any ǫ > 0 (due to wiretap
coding), we can choose n such that I(W k,1;Zk,1) ≤ nǫ for
all k ≥ 1. Also,
I(W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1 ;Z1, . . . , Zk)
= I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, . . . , Zk)
+ I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1).
(6)
We show in Lemma 1 that
I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, . . . , Zk) ≤ N1nǫ, (7)
and in Lemma 2 that
I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1)
= 0. (8)
From (7), (8) and (6)
1
n
I(W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1 ;Z1, . . . , Zk) ≤ N1ǫ. (9)
By fixing N1, we can take ǫ small enough that N1ǫ is less
than any desired value. 
Comment 1: So far we have been considering an infinite
buffer system. But an actual system will have a finite buffer.
Now we compute the key buffer length needed for our system.
If we fix the probability of error for Bob and the upper bound
on equivocation, then we can get the code length n needed.
Also, from the secrecy requirement, we can fix N1. Once n
and N1 are fixed, to ensure that eventually, in slot k we will
use a key from messages before time k −N1, the key buffer
size should be ≥ CMN1n bits. Also, since in each slot, the
key buffer length increases by nRs bits, the key buffer will
have at least CMN1n bits after slot CMN1Rs . In the finite buffer
case eventually key buffer will overflow. We should loose only
the latest bits arriving in any slot.
Comment 2: We can obtain Shannon capacity even with
strong secrecy. For this instead of using the usual wiretap
coding of Wyner in the first minislot of each slot we use the
extractor technique of [18] and [19]. Then I(W k,1;Zk,1) < ǫ
instead of I(W k,1;Zk,1) ≤ nǫ for n large enough. Then from
proof of Theorem 3.1, our coding-decoding scheme provides
I(W k, . . . ,W k−N1 ;Z1, . . . , Zk)→ 0 as n→∞. (10)
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have achieved secrecy rate equal to the
main channel capacity by using previous secret messages as
key for transmitting the current message. This can be done
while still retaining strong secrecy.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA
Lemma 1: The following holds
I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk) ≤ N1nǫ.
(11)
Proof :
I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk)
= I(W k,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk)
+ I(W k−1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1) + . . .+
+ I(W k−N1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1+1,1).
(12)
But
I(W k,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk)
= I(W k,1;Zk,1) + I(W k,1;Z1, . . . , Zk−1, Zk,2|Zk,1)
≤ nǫ+ 0. (13)
because (Z1, . . . , Zk) ⊥ (Zk,1,W k,1), where X ⊥ Y denotes
X is independent of Y . Next consider
I(W k−1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1)
= I(W k−1,1;Zk−1|W k,1)
+ I(W k−1,1; (Z1, . . . , Zk)− Zk−1|W k,1, Zk−1), (14)
where (Z1, . . . , Zk) − Zk−1 denotes the sequence
(Z1, . . . , Zk) without Zk−1. Because W k,1 ⊥
(W k−1, Zk−1,1),
I(W k−1,1;Zk−1,1|W k,1)
= I(W k−1,1;Zk−1,1) ≤ nǫ. (15)
Also, because (Z1, . . . , Zk−2) is independent of
(W k−1,1,W k,1, Zk−1,1),
I(W k−1,1; (Z1, . . . , Zk)− Zk−1,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1)
= I(W k−1,1;Z1, . . . , Zk−2|W k,1, Zk−1,1)
+ I(W k−1,1;Zk, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . Zk−2)
(16)
(a)
= 0 + I(W k−1,1;Zk,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . Zk−2)
+ I(W k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . Zk−2, Zk,1).
(17)
Furthermore, since (W k−1,1,W k,1, Zk,1, Zk−1,1) ⊥
(Z1, . . . , Zk−2) we have
I(W k−1,1;Zk,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−2)
= I(W k−1;Zk,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1). (18)
Using the fact that (W k−1, Zk−1,1) ⊥ (W k,1, Zk,1) we can
directly show that the right side equals zero.
Let A denote the indices of the slots in which messages are
transmitted which are used as keys for transmitting W k,2 and
W k−1,2. Since
(Zk,2, Zk−1,2)↔ (W k−1,1,WA)
↔ (W k,1, Zk−1,1, Zk,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−2),
(19)
where X ↔ Y ↔ Z denotes that {X,Y, Z} forms a markov
chain. we have
I(W k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−2, Zk,1)
≤ I(W k−1,1,WA;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1,
Z1, . . . , Zk−2, Zk,1)
(a)
≤ I(W k−1,1,WA;Zk,2, Zk−1,2)
(20)
≤ I(W k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2) + I(WA;Zk,2, Zk−1|W k−1,1)
(b)
= 0 + I(WA;Zk,2, Zk−1,2)
(c)
= 0, (21)
where (a) follows from (19), (b) follows since
(W k−1,1, Zk−1,1) ⊥ (WA, Zk,2, Zk−1,2) and (c) follows
since WA ⊥ Zk,2, Zk−1,2.
From (14), (15), (18), (21),
I(W k−1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1) ≤ nǫ. (22)
We can similarly show that the other terms on the right side
of (6) are also upper bounded by nǫ. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 2: We have
I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . .W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|
W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1) = 0. (23)
Proof: We have
I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1)
= I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1|
W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1)
+ I(W k,2, , . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk−N1 , . . . , Zk|
W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1).
(24)
Since W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1 is independent of W k,2, . . . ,
W k−N1,2, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1, the first term on the right equals
I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1) = 0.
(25)
The second term
= I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk−N1 , . . . , Zk|
W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1)
= I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk−N1,1, . . . , Zk−N1,1, . . . Zk,1|
W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1)
+ I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;
Zk−N1,2, . . . , Zk,2|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1,
Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1, Zk−N1,1, . . . , Zk,1).
(26)
The first term on the right is zero because (W k,2,W k−1,2,
. . . ,W k−N1,2) is independent of (Zk,1,. . .,Zk−N1,1),(W k,1,
. . .,W k−N1) and Z1,. . . Zk−N1−1. Also since (W k,1, . . . ,
W k−N1,1) and (Zk,1, . . . , Zk−N1,1) are independent of the
other random variables in the second term on the right side,
this term equals
I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk,2, . . . , Zk−N1,2|
Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1). (27)
For convenience we denote it as I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1 with Ŵ2, Ẑ2, Ẑ1
denoting the respective sequences of random variables. Since
I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1, Ẑ2) = I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1) + I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1)
= I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2) + I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1|Ẑ2), (28)
and we have
I(Ŵ2, Ẑ1) = 0 = I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2), (29)
and
Ẑ1 ↔ (Ŵ1, Ŵ2)↔ Ẑ2, (30)
where Ŵ1 = (W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1), we get
I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1)
(a)
= I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1|Ẑ2)
≤ I(Ŵ1, Ŵ2; Ẑ1|Ẑ2)
(b)
≤ I(Ŵ1, Ŵ2; Ẑ1)
= I(Ŵ1; Ẑ1) + I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1|Ŵ1)
(c)
= 0 + I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1), (31)
where (a) follow from (29), (b) follows from (30) (c) follows
from Ŵ1 ⊥ (Ŵ2, Ẑ1). Also Ŵ2 ⊥ Ẑ1. Therefore
I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1) = 0. (32)
From (25), (26) and (32), we get the lemma. 
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